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Cyan, Reverse-Erie, and the PSLRA
Discovery Stay in State Court
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I.

Introduction

In this essay, I analyze an issue that is currently dividing courts
and commentators: does the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”) discovery stay apply when Securities Act claims
proceed in state courts? Last year, in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund, the Supreme Court held that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Securities Act claims,
whether asserted individually or as class actions, and that
defendants do not have a right to remove these claims to federal
court.1 In the wake of Cyan, there has been an inﬂux of Securities Act class actions ﬁled in state courts, raising the question of
which PSRLA provisions apply in state court. In particular, this
ﬁght has centered on the PSLRA discovery stay, which stays all
discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss and which
conﬂicts with many states’ permissive discovery rules.
In this essay, I seek to answer this question by applying the socalled “reverse-Erie” doctrine. First, I contend that the PSLRA
does not expressly preempt states’ permissive discovery rules.
Second, drawing from Supreme Court case law and scholarly
commentary on the reverse-Erie doctrine, I identify the following
considerations, which must be weighed to analyze whether
federal law displaces a state procedure under an implied preemption or judicial choice-of-law analysis: (1) the state’s interest in
applying its own procedure; (2) whether the state procedure applies to all like claims or singles out the federal claim; (3) whether
the state procedure applies to both parties or singles out one
party; (4) the degree to which the state procedure undercuts
federal policy; (5) whether the federal procedure is internallysourced or externally-sourced; (6) the degree to which the choice
of procedure is potentially outcome-determinative; (7) if outcomedeterminative, the risk of forum-shopping; and (8) if outcomedeterminative, the risk of treating similarly situated parties differently based on access to different fora.
Although these considerations are mixed as applied to the
*Wendy Gerwick Couture is a Professor of Law at the University of Idaho
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PSRLA discovery stay, I contend that that they weigh against applying the PSLRA discovery stay in state court, especially in light
of the presumption against preemption and the general rule that
federal law takes state courts as it ﬁnds them.
II. Post-Cyan Uncertainty about the PSLRA Discovery
Stay in State Court
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”),2 in order to address perceived “abusive
and meritless” securities lawsuits.3 According to the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee, the PSLRA
sought “to protect investors, issuers, and all who are associated
with our capital markets from abusive securities litigation.” 4
Among other perceived harms of abusive securities litigation, the
Statement noted that “[i]nvestors always are the ultimate losers
when extortionate ‘settlements’ are extracted from issuers” and
that “the investing public and the entire U.S. economy have been
injured by the unwillingness of the best qualiﬁed persons to serve
on boards of directors and of issuers to discuss publicly their
future prospects.”5
In order to accomplish this goal, the PSLRA added multiple
restrictions applicable to litigation under the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, including appointment of lead plaintiff provisions,6 limitations on lead plaintiffs’ recovery,7 mandatory court
review for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b),8
and a safe harbor from liability for certain forward-looking
statements.9 In addition, the PSLRA added a heightened scienter
pleading requirement for securities fraud actions under the
Exchange Act.10
Of particular relevance to this essay, the PSLRA added the following discovery stay to both Acts:
In any private action arising under this Act, all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, unless the court ﬁnds, upon the motion of any party, that
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to
prevent undue prejudice to that party.11

With this discovery stay, Congress sought to address the following two perceived abusive practices: (1) “the routine ﬁling of
lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there
is a signiﬁcant change in an issuer’s stock price, without any
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only
the faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to
some plausible cause of action”; and (2) “the abuse of the
discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often
economical for the victimized party to settle.”12 In short, the
discovery stay sought to prevent (1) ﬁshing-expedition discovery
22
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and (2) extortive discovery.
In the aftermath of the PSLRA, securities class actions
migrated to state courts, usually asserting claims under state
law.13 By asserting state securities claims in state court, litigants
sought to avoid the strictures of the PSLRA.14 In response, in
1998, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) “in order to prevent certain State private
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.”15 SLUSA added the following key provision
to both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or
Federal court by any private party alleging—
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.16

In short, most securities class actions premised on state law
were deprived of jurisdiction in either federal or state court.
Post-SLUSA, courts faced two interpretive questions: (1)
whether SLUSA deprived state courts of jurisdiction to hear securities class actions premised, not on state law, but on the Securities Act; and (2) whether SLUSA granted defendants a right to
remove Securities Act class actions from state court to federal
court. Unlike Exchange Act claims, over which federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction, Securities Act claims are subject to
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction.17 In addition, the Securities Act bars the removal of Securities Act actions from state to
federal court.18 At issue was whether SLUSA affected one or both
of these general rules to the extent that Securities Act claims
were asserted as class actions in state court.
In Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, the
Supreme Court answered both of these questions in the negative.19
First, relying on SLUSA’s text, which applies only to covered
class actions “based upon the statutory or common law of any
State,” the Court held that SLUSA does not deprive state courts
of jurisdiction over securities class actions asserting Securities
Act claims.20 Thus, post-Cyan, both state and federal courts have
jurisdiction over Securities Act class actions. In addition, for the
same reason, the Cyan Court held that defendants do not have a
right under SLUSA to remove Securities Act class actions that
are ﬁled in state court.21 Thus, if a plaintiff elects a state forum,
the action will proceed in state court. The Court acknowledged
that, if Securities Act class actions proceed in state court,
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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plaintiffs can evade some of the PSLRA’s strictures, arguably
contrary to the policy rationale underlying the enactment of
SLUSA.22 Nonetheless, the Court held that the text of SLUSA
neither deprived state courts of jurisdiction over these actions
nor granted defendants a removal right: “The statute says what
it says—or perhaps better put here, does not say what it does not
say.”23
In Cyan, the Supreme Court parsed several of the PSLRA’s
provisions into substantive provisions, which apply in Securities
Act class actions pending in state court, and procedural provisions, which do not:
Some of the Reform Act’s provisions made substantive changes to
the 1933 and 1934 laws, and applied even when a 1933 Act suit
was brought in state court. For instance, the statute created a “safe
harbor” from federal liability for certain “forward-looking statements” made by company ofﬁcials. Other Reform Act provisions
modiﬁed the procedures used in litigating securities actions, and
applied only when such a suit was brought in federal court. To take
one example, the statute required a lead plaintiff in any class action brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ﬁle a
sworn certiﬁcation stating, among other things, that he had not
purchased the relevant security “at the direction of plaintiff’s
counsel.”24

Notably, however, the Cyan Court did not address whether the
PSLRA discovery stay applies in Securities Act actions pending
in state court, even though this issue was raised in multiple
briefs ﬁled in Cyan.25
The few courts to have addressed whether the PSLRA discovery
stay applies in Securities Act actions pending in state court are
divided. The most recently decided cases have held that the
PSLRA discovery stay does not apply.26 Several state courts,
however, have held that the PSLRA discovery stay applies to Securities Act actions pending in state court.27
In this essay, I seek to answer the unsettled question of
whether the PSLRA discovery stay applies to Securities Act actions pending in state court.
III. Application of the Reverse-Erie Doctrine to the
PSLRA Discovery Stay
The so-called “reverse-Erie doctrine” governs the very issue
posed here: “In state court, when does state law apply and when
does federal law apply?” 28 The reverse-Erie doctrine is the
converse of the classic Erie doctrine, which governs whether a
federal court must apply state law or federal law.29 As explained
by Kevin M. Clermont in his seminal article, Reverse-Erie, this
doctrine includes both preemption analysis and “judicial choiceof-law methodology similar to the Erie methodology.”30
24
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When applying the reverse-Erie doctrine to potentially displace
state rules that are procedural in nature, two presumptions weigh
against that displacement. First, there is a “normal presumption
against pre-emption.”31 Second, there is a “general rule, ‘bottomed
deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state procedure,’ . . . that ‘federal law takes the state courts as it ﬁnds
them.’ ’’ 32 Indeed, this general rule against displacing state
procedural rules is “at its apex when we confront a claim that
federal law requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its courts.”33
And yet, pursuant to the reverse-Erie doctrine, federal law
sometimes displaces state rules that are procedural in nature
when federal claims are heard in state court.34 This displacement
can occur via express preemption of state procedure, via implied
preemption of state procedure, or via judicial choice of law.35
Below, I discuss these aspects of the reverse-Erie doctrine and
then apply them to the question of whether the PSLRA discovery
stay applies in Securities Act actions pending in state court.
A. Express Preemption of State Procedure
If Congress has expressly provided that a federal procedure
preempts a state procedure as applied to a federal claim in state
court, then, under the Supremacy Clause, the federal procedure
applies.36 Because “[p]reemption fundamentally is a question of
congressional intent, . . . when Congress has made its intent
known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an
easy one.”37
The PSLRA provisions in the Securities Act contain explicit
statements about the scope of their applicability. Some of those
provisions, including the certiﬁcation requirement, the appointment of lead plaintiff provisions, and the limitation on lead
plaintiffs’ recovery, apply only to “each private action arising
under this Act that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”38 Thus, these provisions
do not purport to apply in state court, where the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not apply.
Others provisions, however, have broader statements of scope.
The discovery stay applies “[i]n any private action arising under
this Act,”39 and the safe harbor for forward-looking statements
applies “in any private action arising under this title that is
based on an untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a
material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading.”40
Thus, because the discovery stay is not limited to actions “pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” some courts and
commentators have concluded that the PSLRA discovery stay
expressly applies in state court.41
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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There are several strong counterarguments to this interpretation of these statements of scope, however. First, a reasonable interpretation of the different scope language is that Congress
intended for some provisions to apply only to class actions (e.g.,
the appointment of lead plaintiff provisions) and other provisions
to apply to both individual and class actions (e.g., the discovery
stay and the safe harbor). Indeed, all of the provisions preceded
by the more restrictive scope language relate to procedures that
only make sense in the context of class actions.42 Under this interpretation, the different scope language is not intended to differentiate between provisions that apply in state court and those
that do not; rather, it is intended to differentiate between provisions that apply only in class actions and those that apply in both
individual and class actions.
Second, one of the PSLRA provisions preceded by the broader
“[i]n any private action arising under this Act” scope language is
the provision related to sanctions for abusive litigation. That provision mandates that, upon ﬁnal adjudication of the action, the
court shall make speciﬁc ﬁndings in the record about each party’s
and attorney’s compliance with “Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”43 In addition, if the court ﬁnds that any party
or attorney violated Rule 11(b), “the court shall impose sanctions
on such party or attorney in accordance with Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”44 These explicit references to
Rule 11 undercut the argument that, with this scope language,
Congress intended for this provision to apply in state court.
Of note, some courts have offered other, less compelling reasons
for not reading the discovery stay’s scope language as an express
preemption provision. First, courts have noted that some states,
including California, do not have “motions to dismiss”; rather,
they have “demurrers.”45 This argument unduly elevates form
over substance as both procedures operate to test the plaintiff’s
complaint. 46 Second, courts have reasoned that, if Congress
thought that the PSLRA discovery stay already applied in Securities Act actions in state court, there would have been no reason
to include within SLUSA a provision authorizing a federal court
to stay state court discovery “as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”47 This argument
fails to recognize, however, that this SLUSA provision can be
used by a federal court to stay discovery in other types of state
court litigation, including individual actions pending under state
securities law and derivative suits.48
In sum, I contend that Congress has not “made its intent known
through explicit statutory language” that the PSLRA discovery
stay expressly preempts state discovery rules. First, there is a
presumption against preemption. Second, there is an alternative
26
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reasonable interpretation for the differential scope language.
Third, such a reading of the discovery stay’s scope language would
be incongruous as applied to the Rule 11 sanctions provision.
B. Implied Obstacle Preemption of State Procedure
and Judicial Choice of Law
Even if Congress has not expressly preempted a state procedure, the state procedure might be impliedly preempted. There
are three types of implied preemption: (1) ﬁeld preemption where
a state “regulates conduct in a ﬁeld that Congress intended the
Federal Government to occupy exclusively”;49 (2) conﬂict preemption “where it is impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements”;50 and (3) conﬂict preemption where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”51 When a state procedure as applied to a federal claim
is impliedly preempted, it is usually under the third strand of
implied preemption, so-called “obstacle preemption.”
Several of the Supreme Court cases analyzing whether a particular federal procedure applies to a federal claim litigated in
state court have framed the issue as one of obstacle preemption;52
however, in other cases, the Court has eschewed a preemption
analysis for a judicial choice-of-law analysis based on a balancing
of state and federal interests.53 Indeed, the distinction between
an obstacle preemption analysis and a judicial choice-of-law analysis is murky when applied to the question of whether a particular state or federal procedure applies to a federal claim litigated
in state court. As explained by Professor Clermont, the two
analyses intersect and inform each other:
In the middle zone of obstacle and ﬁeld preemption, the accommodation of federal and state interests helps to concretize
preemption: recall that whenever federal interests overcome state
interests in an Erie sense, there should be such preemption. A beneﬁt of this insight is to alleviate the difﬁculty of preemption’s obscure bounds. The increasing attention to accommodation of federal
and state interests in that middle zone moots the precise location of
the outer boundary of preemption, as that boundary becomes an
imperceptibly transitional zone in the middle of the broad subject of
reverse-Erie.54

Whether under an obstacle preemption analysis or a judicial
choice-of-law analysis, the Supreme Court has addressed the
question of whether a particular federal procedure applies to a
federal claim in state court in ﬁve key cases over the past century:
Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,55 Dice v. Akron, Canton &
Youngstown R. Co.,56 Felder v. Casey,57 Monessen Southwestern
Railway Co. v. Morgan,58 and Johnson v. Fankell.59 These cases
involved either claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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(“FELA”),60 which provides employees of common carriers a cause
of action against the carrier to recover damages for injuries
caused by the carrier’s negligence, or claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,61 which provides plaintiffs a cause of action to recover
damages for civil rights violations against those acting under
color of state law. FELA and § 1983 claims, like Securities Act
claims, are subject to concurrent federal and state court
jurisdiction.
In four of these cases, the Supreme Court held that federal law
displaced state law that was procedural in nature. First, in
Brown, the Court held that the more lenient federal pleading
standard applied to a FELA claim pending in Georgia state court
rather than Georgia’s more stringent pleading standard.62 The
Georgia trial court dismissed the FELA complaint under a Georgia rule of practice that construed pleading allegations “most
strongly against the pleader.”63 The Georgia Court of Appeals afﬁrmed, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari.64 After
granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the
allegations in the complaint were sufﬁcient to state a claim under
the federal pleading standard,65 and the Court reversed and
remanded because “[s]trict local rules of pleading cannot be used
to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery authorized by federal law.”66
Second, in Dice, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to
federal law, the jury should be the trier of fact on the issue of
whether a release of a FELA claim was fraudulently induced,
even though the case was pending in Ohio state court and, under
Ohio law, the judge would have been the trier of fact.67 Before the
Ohio trial court, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s FELA
claim was released, and the plaintiff contended that the release
was void because it was fraudulently induced.68 Under Ohio law,
which maintained a division between law and equity, the jury
was the trier of fact on issues relating to negligence, but the
judge was the trier of fact on the issue of whether a release of a
negligence claim was fraudulently induced.69 Applying Ohio law,
the trial judge found that the release was not fraudulent and
thus entered judgment for the defendant, notwithstanding the
jury’s verdict for the plaintiff.70 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals and sustained the trial court’s action.71 After
granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, under
federal law, there is a jury trial right on the question of whether
a FELA claim release was fraudulent.72 The Court reversed the
Ohio Supreme Court and remanded because “the right to trial by
jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to
permit it to be classiﬁed as a mere ‘local rule of procedure’ for
28
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denial in the manner that Ohio has here used.”73
Third, in Felder, the Supreme Court held that, where federal
law does not impose a pre-suit notice-of-claim requirement on
§ 1983 claims, Wisconsin’s pre-suit notice-of-claim statute did not
apply to § 1983 claims pending in Wisconsin state court.74 The
Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute barred actions against state
government subdivisions, agencies, or ofﬁcers unless the plaintiff
provided a detailed written notice of the claim within 120 days of
the alleged injury.75 The plaintiff did not comply with the noticeof-claim requirements.76 The Wisconsin trial court denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for failure to satisfy Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals afﬁrmed.77 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed, however, holding that the state’s notice-of-claim
requirement was a procedural rule that applied to § 1983 claims
pending in the state’s courts.78 After granting certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
remanded because “application of the notice requirement burdens
the exercise of the federal right by forcing civil rights victims
who seek redress in state courts to comply with a requirement
that is entirely absent from civil rights litigation in federal courts”
and because “[s]tates may not apply such an outcomedeterminative law when entertaining substantive federal rights
in their courts.”79
Fourth, in Monessen, the Supreme Court held that, consistent
with federal law, prejudgment interest was not recoverable by a
prevailing plaintiff in a FELA action pending in Pennsylvania
state court, even though Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
238 provided for prejudgment interest to accrue in personal injury
actions.80 Applying Rule 238, the Pennsylvania trial court assessed prejudgment interest, a three-judge panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court afﬁrmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court afﬁrmed, concluding that “neither the ‘worthy goal’ nor the
speciﬁc provisions of Rule 238 contravened the purposes and provisions of the FELA.” 81 After granting certiorari, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
remanded because “prejudgment interest constitutes too substantial a part of a defendant’s potential liability under the FELA for
this Court to accept a State’s classiﬁcation of a provision such as
Rule 238 as a mere ‘local rule of procedure.’ ’’82
In the most recent case, however, the Supreme Court held that
state procedure governed, even though it was inconsistent with a
particular federal procedure. In Johnson, the Supreme Court
held that, because Idaho Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 did not
provide the right to an interlocutory appeal of an order denying
the qualiﬁed immunity defense in a § 1983 action, the defendants
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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in a § 1983 action pending in Idaho state court were not entitled
to an interlocutory appeal, even though the defendants would
have had such a right if the case were pending in federal court.83
The Idaho trial court denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the defense of qualiﬁed immunity, and the defendants ﬁled a notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.84 The
Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because, under Idaho
procedural rules, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a ﬁnal order or judgment that is appealable.85 After
granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court afﬁrmed, holding
that “[w]e therefore cannot agree with petitioners that § 1983’s
recognition of the defense of qualiﬁed immunity pre-empts a
State’s consistent application of its neutral procedural rules, even
when those rules deny an interlocutory appeal in this context.”86
Reviewing this precedent, several prominent scholars have
sought to encapsulate the analysis—whether it be one of obstacle
preemption or judicial choice of law. For example, Anthony J. Bellia Jr. summarized the analysis as follows: “Congress may require
state courts to enforce federal procedural rules that are ‘part and
parcel’ of a federal right of action; and Congress may, by implication, require state courts to follow federal procedural rules when
application of a state procedural rule would unnecessarily burden
a federal right.”87 As summarized by Professor Clermont, courts
“balance the state’s interests in having its legal rule applied in
state court on this issue in this case against the federal interests
in having federal law displace the rule of this particular state,
while trying to avoid differences in outcome.” 8 8 Professor
Clermont further explained that, when applying the outcomedeterminative test in the reverse-Erie context, courts should draw
from the ‘‘ ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws.’ ’’89 Thus, as these twin aims are applied in the reverse-Erie
context, courts should seek to avoid “shopping by plaintiffs or
defendants between the two systems” and “unfairness in that
certain classes of people have a choice of court systems,” either
vertically (federal-state) or horizontally (interstate).90
Drawing from this Supreme Court precedent and scholarly
commentary, I have identiﬁed eight key considerations applicable
to the reverse-Erie analysis, absent express preemption: (1) the
state’s interest in applying its own procedure; (2) whether the
state procedure applies to all like claims or singles out the federal
claim; (3) whether the state procedure applies to both parties or
singles out one party; (4) the degree to which the state procedure
undercuts federal policy; (5) whether the federal procedure is
internally-sourced or externally-sourced; (6) the degree to which
the choice of procedure is potentially outcome-determinative; (7)
30
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if outcome-determinative, the risk of forum-shopping; and (8) if
outcome-determinative, the risk of treating similarly situated
parties differently based on access to different fora.
Each of these considerations, and the interrelationship among
them, is discussed further below and then applied to the conﬂict
between permissive state discovery rules and the PSLRA
discovery stay.
1. The State’s Interest in Applying Its Own Procedure
As discussed above, the general rule is that ‘‘ ‘federal law takes
the state courts as it ﬁnds them.’ ’’91 Thus, even when holding
that a particular state procedure is displaced by a federal procedure, the Supreme Court has always at least acknowledged the
state’s interest in applying its own procedure.92 The state’s interest in applying its own procedure can be overridden, however.
Indeed, the dissenting opinions in Brown, Dice, and Felder
criticized the majority opinions for failing to give due respect to
the states’ respective interests in “cherish[ing] formalities,”93
“exercise[ing] a preference in adhering to historic ways of dealing
with a claim of fraud,”94 and “ensur[ing] that public ofﬁcials will
receive prompt notice of wrongful conditions or practices . . .
[and] enabl[ing] ofﬁcials to investigate claims in a timely
fashion.”95
Applied to states’ permissive discovery rules, each state has
adopted its own discovery rules,96 which seek to address information asymmetries while not exacerbating cost asymmetries.97
State judges and attorneys are familiar with those rules.98 Thus,
each state has both normative and administrative interests in
applying its own rules of discovery, which, in many states, permit
discovery while a motion testing the pleadings, like a motion to
dismiss or demurrer, is pending. Thus, this consideration weighs
against displacing state discovery rules. That said, states may already impose discovery stays in particular types of litigation or
at the court’s discretion; thus, imposing a discovery stay in Securities Act claims would not necessarily be anathema to the
states.99
2. Whether the State Procedure Applies to All Like
Claims or Singles Out the Federal Claim
Federal law is less likely to displace a state procedure that applies to all like claims as opposed to singling out the federal
claim. For example, in Johnson, where the Supreme Court afﬁrmed the state’s refusal to grant the defendants an interlocutory appeal, the Court stressed that the state’s dismissal of the
defendants’ interlocutory appeal “rested squarely on a neutral
state Rule regarding the administration of the state courts.”100
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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The Johnson Court also distinguished the notice-of-claim rule in
Felder, which was displaced by federal law, because that rule
purportedly “target[ed] civil rights claims against the State.”101 Of
note, the dissent in Felder and commentators have criticized this
characterization of the state’s notice-of-claim rule, which applied
to “all actions against municipal defendants, whether brought
under state or federal law.”102
While the neutrality of the state’s procedure is relevant, the
Court has displaced state rules that applied to all like claims.
The state pleading standard in Brown applied to all pleadings,
not merely FELA pleadings.103 The separation of law and equity
in Dice applied in all negligence cases, not merely FELA cases.104
The prejudgment interest in Monessen accrued in all personal
injury actions, not merely FELA actions.105
Applied to states’ permissive discovery rules, those rules apply
broadly rather than singling out Securities Act claims or even securities claims. Thus, this consideration weighs against imposing
the PSLRA discovery stay to Securities Act claims in state court.
3. Whether the State Procedure Applies to Both Parties or Singles Out One Party
Federal law is more likely to displace a state procedure that
singles out one party rather than applying to both parties. For
example, in Felder, where the Supreme Court displaced the
state’s pre-suit notice-of-claim requirement, the Court characterized the requirement as “a substantive burden imposed only upon
those who seek redress for injuries resulting from the use or misuse of governmental authority.”106 The Court emphasized that
“[t]his defendant-speciﬁc focus of the notice requirement serves
to distinguish it, rather starkly, from rules uniformly applicable
to all suits, such as rules governing service of process or substitution of parties, which respondents cite as examples of procedural
requirements that penalize noncompliance through dismissal.”107
Similarly, in Monessen, the Court displaced the state’s rule allowing a plaintiff to recover prejudgment interest, where such a rule
beneﬁtted the plaintiff and harmed the defendant.108 Finally, in
Johnson, where the Court upheld the state’s dismissal of the
defendants’ interlocutory appeal, the Court emphasized that the
state rule “generally permits appeals only of ‘judgments, orders
and degrees which are ﬁnal,’ without regard to the identity of the
party seeking appeal.”109
On occasion, federal law has also displaced state procedures
that, while theoretically applicable to both parties, in practice
tend to harm one party. For example, in Brown,110 the Court
displaced the state’s strict pleading standard, which in theory applied to both parties’ pleadings, where in practice the rule harmed
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the plaintiff’s ability to have his FELA case heard. In Dice,111 the
Court displaced the state’s denial of a jury trial right on the issue
of whether the claim release was fraudulent, which in theory
could have inured to the beneﬁt of both parties, where in practice
the plaintiff was more likely to beneﬁt from a jury trial.
Turning to state rules allowing permissive discovery, these
rules permit discovery by both parties, rather than only permitting one party to engage in discovery. Thus, at least in theory,
these rules apply to both parties rather than singling out one
party. In practice, however, the plaintiff is far more likely to beneﬁt from early discovery, both to enable the plaintiff to marshal
facts in support of an amended pleading and to impose costs
incentivizing the defendant to settle. Therefore, although this
consideration weighs in favor of allowing states to apply permissive discovery rules, it does so only slightly.
4. The Degree to Which the State Procedure
Undercuts Federal Policy
Consistent with both an obstacle preemption analysis and a
judicial choice-of-law analysis, a key consideration is the degree
to which the state procedure undercuts federal policy. The
Supreme Court’s analysis of this consideration is a bit of a moving target, however.
In Brown and Felder, the Court identiﬁed the applicable federal
policy as one of providing plaintiffs a remedy under federal law
and thus held that federal law overrode state procedures that
undercut plaintiffs’ ability to recover. In Brown, the Court
displaced the state’s strict pleading standard because, as pleaded
by the plaintiff in the case, the allegations “if proven would show
an injury of the precise kind for which Congress has provided a
remedy” under FELA.112 In Felder, the Court stated that “the
central purpose of the Reconstruction-Era laws is to provide
compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal rights by
state actors.”113 Thus, the Court displaced the state’s notice-ofclaim requirement because it “undermines this ‘uniquely federal
remedy.’ ’’114 The Felder Court even went so far as to suggest that
“States may make litigation of federal rights as congenial as they
see ﬁt . . . because such congeniality does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ goals.”115
Contrary to this dicta in Felder, however, the Monessen Court
reframed the federal interest to include, not only the plaintiff’s
right to a remedy, but also the defendant’s right to having that
remedy limited to ‘‘ ‘the proper measure of damages’ under the
FELA.” 116 The Court thus displaced a state court rule that
expanded the plaintiff’s remedy under FELA by allowing for the
recovery of prejudgment interest. Of note, the dissent in Felder
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had criticized the majority for stating a rule that seemed to beneﬁt only plaintiffs: “If the Court means the theory to be taken seriously, it should follow that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are
entitled to the beneﬁt of all federal court procedural rules that
are ‘outcome determinative.’ ’’117
In Dice, rather than focusing on the overarching federal policy
of providing plaintiffs a remedy under federal law or the scope of
that remedy under federal law, the Court focused on the federal
policy underlying the speciﬁc procedure at issue. In Dice, because
‘‘ ‘[t]he right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of
our system of federal jurisprudence’ . . . that . . . is ‘part and
parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers’ Liability Act,’ ’’118 the Court displaced a state rule that disallowed a jury trial on the issue of whether a claim release was
fraudulently induced.
Finally, in Johnson, the Court focused on the federal policy
underlying the qualiﬁed immunity defense in § 1983 cases, which
is “to protect the State and its ofﬁcials from overenforcement of
federal rights.”119 Thus, even though the state did not afford the
defendants the right to an interlocutory appeal, the Court held
that “application of the State’s procedural rules in this context is
thus less an interference with federal interests than a judgment
about how best to balance the competing state interests of limiting interlocutory appeals and providing state ofﬁcials with immediate review of the merits of their defense.”120
How this consideration plays out in context of states’ permissive discovery rules depends on the applicable federal policy.
First, drawing from Brown and Felder, the federal policy at issue
could be affording plaintiffs the right to recover on meritorious
claims under the Securities Act, which provides a “uniquely
federal remedy.” States’ permissive discovery rules do not
undercut this federal policy; rather, they merely make “litigation
of federal rights as congenial” as these states see ﬁt. Second,
drawing from Monessen, the federal policy at issue could
incorporate the defendant’s right to have the Securities Act remedy limited. The discovery stay is not a direct limitation on the
plaintiff’s remedy; in practice, however, it bars any remedy where
the plaintiff cannot state a claim without the beneﬁt of discovery.
Thus, at least arguably, permissive discovery undercuts the
federal policy in only affording plaintiffs a remedy if they can
state a claim without discovery. Finally, drawing from Dice, the
relevant federal policies could be the policies underlying the
discovery stay itself, which are preventing ﬁshing-expedition
discovery and extortive discovery in Securities Act litigation. As
noted by the court in Milano, permissive state discovery
frustrates these federal policies.121
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I contend that the better approach, consistent with Brown and
Felder, is to look at the policies underlying Securities Act claims
writ large, rather than focusing on the unique policies underlying
the discovery stay in particular. Permissive state discovery does
not interfere with the plaintiffs’ ability to recover on meritorious
Securities Act claims. In addition, although permissive discovery
might increase the likelihood that the plaintiffs’ cases can
proceed, it does not expand the defendants’ liability beyond that
which the facts ultimately support. Thus, I argue that this
consideration weighs against applying the PSLRA discovery stay
in state court.
5. Whether the Federal Procedure Is InternallySourced or Externally-Sourced
If the source of the federal procedure is internal to the federal
statute creating the federal claim, the federal procedure is more
likely to apply in state court than if it is externally-sourced.122 In
Johnson, the Court emphasized that “it is important to focus on
the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue.”123 The
Court characterized the federal right to an interlocutory appeal
as externally-sourced and thus inapplicable in state court: “In
this case, . . . Congress has mentioned nothing about interlocutory appeals in § 1983; rather, the right to an immediate appeal
in the federal court system is found in § 1291, which obviously
has no application to state courts.”124 The Johnson Court differentiated Dice, where the Court held that the federal jury trial
right applied in state court, by characterizing the right to a jury
trial as internally-sourced: “In Dice we held that the FELA preempted a state rule denying a right to a jury trial. In that case,
however, we made clear that Congress had provided in FELA
that the jury trial procedure was to be part of claims brought
under the Act.”125
On occasion, however, the Court has applied externally-sourced
federal procedures in state court. For example, in Brown, the
Court displaced a strict state pleading standard with a more
lenient federal pleading standard, even though that federal standard was not speciﬁc to FELA cases.126
The PSLRA discovery stay is internally-sourced. The stay is
not an overarching federal procedure broadly applicable to federal
claims; rather, it is a procedure speciﬁcally applicable to Securities Act claims. Thus, this consideration weighs in favor of applying the PSLRA discovery stay to Securities Act claims in state
court.
6. The Degree to Which the Choice of Procedure Is
Potentially Outcome-Determinative
Federal law is much more likely to displace a state procedure if
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the choice of procedure is potentially outcome-determinative. Of
course, “[p]rocedure invariably changes the entitlements and
values of the claims that implicate them,” including by imposing
costs to comply with various procedures and by “altering the
probability of recovery on a claim.”127 However, in Johnson, the
Court clariﬁed that, by using the term “outcome,” the Court is
referring “to the ultimate disposition of the case.”128
Thus, in Brown, Felder, and Monessen, the Court applied
federal law where application of the state procedure would have
changed the ultimate disposition of the case. In Brown, the state’s
stringent pleading standard resulted in the dismissal of a FELA
case that would have proceeded in federal court.129 In Felder, the
state’s notice-of-claim requirement barred a § 1983 case that
would have proceeded in federal court.130 In Monessen, the state’s
award of prejudgment interest signiﬁcantly increased the
plaintiff’s recovery beyond what the plaintiff would have
recovered in federal court.131
Likewise, in Johnson, the Court refused to displace a state procedure that barred a defendant’s interlocutory appeal on the
defense of qualiﬁed immunity because that right affected the timing of disposition, not the ultimate disposition itself:
If petitioners’ claim to qualiﬁed immunity is meritorious, there is
no suggestion that the application of the Idaho rules of procedure
will produce a ﬁnal result different from what a federal ruling
would produce. Petitioners were able to argue their immunity from
suit claim to the trial court, just as they would to a federal court.
And the claim will be reviewable by the Idaho Supreme Court after
the trial court enters a ﬁnal judgment, thus providing petitioners
with a further chance to urge their immunity. Consequently, the
postponement of the appeal until after ﬁnal judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of the case.132

And yet, in Dice, the Court displaced a state procedure that did
not affect the ultimate disposition of the case, at least not directly.
In that case, the Court required the state to afford a jury trial
right on the question of whether a FELA claim release was
fraudulently induced.133 Under state law, the trier of fact would
have been the trial court. At least theoretically, the identity of
the trier of fact should not affect the trier of fact’s ﬁndings.
Indeed, the dissenting opinion in Dice criticized the majority for
proceeding “on the theory that Congress included as a part of the
right created by the Employers’ Liability Act an assumed likelihood that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to
plaintiffs.”134 In practice, however, the identity of the trier of fact
likely does result in different outcomes.
Applying this consideration here, the availability of permissive
discovery is less outcome-determinate than the procedures in
Brown, Felder, and Monessen; is more outcome-determinative
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than the procedure in Johnson; and has a similarly indirect
outcome-determinative effect as in Dice. The availability of
permissive discovery indirectly affects the ultimate disposition of
a Securities Act case only if the plaintiff uncovers facts in
discovery that enable the plaintiff to amend an otherwise
deﬁcient complaint in such a way that the complaint survives a
motion testing the pleadings. Unlike the outcome-determinative
state procedures in Brown, Felder, and Monessen, the availability
of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending does not necessarily permit certain cases to proceed in state court that would
fail in federal court. Unlike the non-outcome-determinative procedure in Johnson, the availability of discovery does not merely
affect the timing of disposition. Some complaints that would be
dismissed absent the plaintiff’s ability to engage in discovery will
proceed. Like in Dice, the availability of discovery during the
pendency of a motion to dismiss could indirectly affect the
ultimate disposition of some cases. Notably, other state procedures, including permissive state pleading standards and pleading amendment standards, are even more likely to affect the
ultimate disposition of the case than the availability of discovery
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. On balance, I contend
that the availability of permissive discovery could affect the
ultimate disposition of some subset of Securities Act cases.
7. If Outcome-Determinative, the Risk of ForumShopping
As explained by Professor Clermont, the outcome-determinative
nature of a state procedure should not be considered in the
abstract; rather, it should be considered in light of the “twin aims
of the Erie rule,” one of which is the “discouragement of forumshopping.” 135 Although the Supreme Court has not directly
discussed forum shopping in its reverse-Erie precedent, the goal
of discouraging forum-shopping is implicit in the Court’s focus on
whether the choice of procedure affects the ultimate disposition
of the case. Thus, in light of my above conclusion that the availability of permissive discovery could, at least indirectly, affect the
ultimate disposition of some subset of cases, I will consider
whether states’ permissive discovery rules contribute to forumshopping.
Post-Cyan, there has been an increase in state-court ﬁlings of
Securities Act claims.136 Cornerstone Research found as follows:
In 2018, the combined number of federal Section 11 ﬁlings and
state 1933 Act ﬁlings was 41. This comprised 13 parallel ﬁlings, 17
state-only ﬁlings, and 11 federal-only ﬁlings. Overall, these ﬁlings
in federal and state courts increased by 52 percent compared to
2017 due to the rise in state ﬁling activity.

Consistent therewith, “Section 11 claims decreased in federal
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courts as a portion of ﬁling activity moved to state court.”137
But, there are multiple reasons for Securities Act plaintiffs to
elect to proceed in state court, only one of which is the potential
to avoid the PSLRA discovery stay. First, it is extremely unlikely
that the various class action-speciﬁc procedures of the PSLRA,
which by their very terms purport to apply only to “each private
action arising under this Act that is brought as a plaintiff class
action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”138 apply
in state court. Indeed, the Cyan Court stated that one of those
procedures, the sworn certiﬁcation requirement, does not apply
in state court.139 Further, commentators have noted that “plaintiffs in state court are much more likely to survive defendants’ efforts to dismiss the case, even with relatively weaker pleadings.”140
Consistent with this assessment, Cornerstone Research found
that “[o]nly 33 percent of state Section 11 ﬁlings were dismissed
in 2010–2017 compared to 48 percent of Section 11-only federal
ﬁlings.”141 Finally, some state courts “have a reputation for . . . a
receptive judiciary when it comes to securities class action
suits.”142
Thus, if states’ permissive discovery rules contribute to forumshopping, it is likely only in a marginal fashion.
8. If Outcome-Determinative, the Risk of Treating
Similarly Situated Parties Differently Based on Access
to Different Fora
Again, as explained by Professor Clermont, the outcomedeterminative nature of a state procedure should be considered
in light of the “twin aims of the Erie rule,” one of which is the
“avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’ ’’143 This
consideration potentially applies in two scenarios: (1) if the party
harmed by the state procedure is the one who elected to proceed
in state court, perhaps this undercuts the argument that federal
procedure should apply in state court; and (2) if the party harmed
by the state procedure does not have the option of proceeding in
federal court, perhaps this enhances the argument that federal
procedure should apply in state court.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected this
consideration under the ﬁrst scenario. The Brown, Dice, and
Felder plaintiffs could have avoided the stringent state procedures
at issue by ﬁling their cases in federal court, yet the Court nonetheless displaced the state procedures. Indeed, the dissenters in
these cases made just this point.144 The Felder Court, however,
explicitly rejected “this bitter-with-the-sweet argument” as applied to plaintiffs who elect to proceed in state court.145 In Johnson, however, the defendant could have avoided the state’s disallowance of interlocutory appeals by removing the case to federal
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court, yet the defendant did not do so. Although the Court did not
rely on a “bitter-with-the-sweet argument” in its opinion refusing
to override the state procedural rule, Justice Ginsburg mentioned
it during oral argument: “But you could have removed—in any
case, wouldn’t one factor, if one wants—if a Federal court is going
to tell—if this case is going to tell the State, change your procedure for these cases only, that the defendant who is asking for
that could have gotten himself into the Federal forum.”146
The Supreme Court has not addressed this consideration under
the second scenario, where the party harmed by the state procedure does not have access to federal court. This scenario was
implicated in Monessen because the state’s allowance of prejudgment interest harmed the defendant147 and FELA defendants do
not have a removal right,148 but the Court did not discuss this
consideration in its opinion.
Applying this consideration here, the availability of permissive
discovery in state court, like in Monessen, implicates the second
scenario. Permissive discovery potentially harms the defendant
by permitting ﬁshing-expedition discovery, which can potentially
affect the outcome of the case, and extortive discovery, which can
potentially force the defendant to settle an unmeritorious case in
order to avoid the costs of discovery, but the defendant does not
have a removal right.149 Thus, this consideration weighs in favor
of applying the PSLRA discovery stay in state court. However,
because the Supreme Court has not relied on this consideration
in this scenario, even in Monessen where it was directly implicated, it is unclear how much weight to afford this one of Erie’s
twin aims in the reverse-Erie context.
C. Recommendation
In sum, the following considerations weigh against applying
the PSLRA discovery stay in state court: (1) each state has both
normative and administrative interests in applying its own
discovery rules, which are at the core of state procedure; (2)
states’ permissive discovery rules apply to all like claims and do
not single out Securities Act claims; (3) states’ permissive
discovery rules apply to both parties, rather than singling out
one party, although they admittedly are more likely to beneﬁt Securities Act plaintiffs in practice; and (4) states’ permissive
discovery rules do not undercut the federal policy of providing a
remedy for meritorious Securities Act claims, although they do
admittedly undercut the speciﬁc policies supporting the PSLRA
discovery stay of preventing ﬁshing-expedition discovery and
extortive discovery.
The following considerations weigh in favor of applying the
PSRLA discovery stay in state court: (1) the PSLRA discovery
stay is internal to the Securities Act rather than externally© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019
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sourced; (2) the application of states’ permissive discovery rules
to Securities Act claims has the potential, in practice, to indirectly
affect the ultimate disposition of a subset of cases where the
plaintiff uncovers facts in discovery that enable the plaintiff to
amend an otherwise deﬁcient complaint so as to avoid dismissal;
(3) the outcome-determinative impact of states’ permissive
discovery rules in these cases has the potential to contribute to
forum-shopping, although that impact is marginal in light of the
other reasons that plaintiffs might elect to proceed in state court;
and (4) the defendant, which is the party potentially harmed by
the outcome-determinative impact of states’ permissive discovery
rules, does not have the right to remove the case to federal court.
On balance, although these considerations are mixed, I contend
that they weigh against applying the PSLRA discovery stay in
state court, especially against the backdrop of the presumption
against preemption and the general rule that federal law takes
state courts as it ﬁnds them.
IV. Conclusion
Thus, I contend that the PSLRA discovery stay does not apply
to Securities Act claims pending in state court. The PSLRA does
not expressly preempt states’ permissive discovery rules, and the
considerations informing an obstacle preemption analysis and a
judicial choice-of-law analysis weigh against applying the PSRLA
discovery stay in state court. Finally, even though I argue that
the PSLRA discovery stay does not apply in state court, there are
other means whereby discovery could be stayed in Securities Act
cases pending in state court. First, state courts may have the
discretion under state law to stay discovery under certain
circumstances.150 Second, if there is a parallel federal action, the
federal court can stay discovery in the state case “as necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”151
NOTES:
1
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061,
1066 (2018).
2
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (Dec. 22, 1995).
3

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 730–31.

6

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3).

7

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(4), 78u-4(a)(4).

8

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c).

40

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

[VOL. 47:1 2019] CYAN, REVERSE-ERIE, AND PSLRA DISCOVERY STAY
9

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5.

10

15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(b)(2).

11

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Note that the discovery stay
provision in the Exchange Act omits commas around the phrase “upon the motion of any party,” but that difference does not appear to affect the meaning.
12

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.

13

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227, § 2(2) (Nov. 3, 1998).
14

Id. at § 2(3).

15

Id. at § 2(5).

16

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f).

17

15 U.S.C.A. § 77v(a).

18

Id.

19

Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066.

20

Id. at 1069.

21

Id. at 1075.

22

Id. at 1072.

23

Id. at 1069.

24

Id. at 1066–67 (internal citations omitted).

25

E.g., Brief for Petitioners, Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL 3773872, at *27 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2017) (“In addition, some state courts in 1933 Act suits have refused to stay discovery pending a motion to dismiss, on the view that the Reform Act’s automatic-stay
provision does not apply in state court either.”); see also Brief of Institutional
Investors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2017
WL 4770980, at *16 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2017); Brief of Alibaba Group Holding Limited
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL
4483907, at *27–30 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017); Brief for Business Roundtable and the
Society for Corporate Governance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL 3948180, at *14–15 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017); Brief of
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL 3948181, at *10
(U.S. Sept. 5, 2017); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation As Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2017 WL 3913760, at *21–23 (U.S.
Sept. 5, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners,
Cyan, No. 15-1439, 2016 WL 3538388, at *11–12 (U.S. June 27, 2016).
26
E.g., Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Stay Further Discovery Pending
Ruling on Demurrer, Switzer v. W.R. Hambrecht & Co., Nos. CGC-18-564904,
CGC-18-565324, 2018 WL 4704776, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2018) (“The
Court ﬁnds that the PSLRA’s provision for a discovery stay is of a procedural
nature, and therefore only applies to actions ﬁled in federal court, not state
court. Therefore, the motion is denied.”); Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to
Stay Proceedings, In re Paciﬁc Biosciences of Cal. Inc., No. CIV 509210, 2012
WL 1932469 (May 25, 2012) (“Defendants argue that this case involving 1933
Securities Act claims is a ‘private action’ subject to the automatic stay. Although
a creative argument, it is not persuasive.”).
27
E.g., Milano v. Auhill, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 33398997, at *4 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1996) (“The amendments of 1995 to the federal Securities Act

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

41

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL
of 1933 apply to an action brought in a state court under the act, alleging a
private action under the 1933 Act . . .”); Notice of Ruling, Shores v. Cinergi
Pictures Entm’t Inc., No. BC149861 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 1996) (“The court
ruled that the automatic stay provision in Section 27(b) of the Securities Act applies to all cases ﬁled under the Securities Act, whether in state or federal
court.”).
28

Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (2006).

29

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76 (1938).

30

Clermont, supra note 28, at 20.

31

Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997).

32

Id. at 919 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)).
33

Id. at 922.

34

See, infra, text accompanying notes 61–81.

35

Clermont, supra note 28, at 20–21.

36

Id. at 20. A different question is posed if Congress seeks to preempt a
state procedure as applied to a state-law-claim. See Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 Yale L.J. 947, 952 (2001) (“It is therefore appropriate to analyze the constitutional question raised here—whether Congress
may regulate state court procedures in state law cases—with reference to
conﬂict-of-law principles. Under traditional conﬂicts principles, I argue,
Congress has no authority to prescribe procedural rules for state courts to follow in state law cases.”).
37

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).

38

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a).

39

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(b)(1).

40

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2(c)(1).

41

Israel David & Samuel P. Groner, State Court Securities Lawsuits And
the PSLRA in a Post-‘Cyan’ Era, N.Y.L.J., vol. 259, no. 85 (May 3, 2018)
(“Because these provisions apply to any actions brought under the 1933 Act and
are not limited to actions brought pursuant to the Federal Rules, they should be
applicable even in state court actions asserting 1933 Act claims.”); Milano v.
Auhill, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 33398997, at *2–3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 2,
1996) (“In other words, an intention appears on the part of Congress to apply
section 27(a) of the amendments only to class actions in federal court, but to apply section 27(b) to all private actions based on alleged violations of the 1933
Act, regardless of whether they were brought in state or federal court.
Signiﬁcantly, the provisions for stay of discovery are contained in section 27(b).
It appears to this court that Congress intended the provisions creating a new
right on the part of defendants, to put plaintiffs to the burden of pleading and
offering to prove speciﬁc allegations under the 1933 Act, and to a stay of
discovery until plaintiffs meet the burden, to be applied to all cases in state as
well as federal courts if at least one cause of action is within these
amendments.”).
42

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a).

43

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(c)(1).

44

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(c)(2).

45

42

Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings, In re Paciﬁc
© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

[VOL. 47:1 2019] CYAN, REVERSE-ERIE, AND PSLRA DISCOVERY STAY
Biosciences of Cal. Inc., No. CIV 509210, 2012 WL 1932469 (May 25, 2012)
(“Further Section 27(b)(1) hinges the discovery stay upon the pendency of a ‘motion to dismiss’, which is the title of a motion in federal court attacking the sufﬁciency of the complaint. Motion to dismiss is not the nomenclature used in California state court, but rather it is demurrers and motions to strike which
challenge the adequacy of pleadings.”).
46

See Milano v. Auhill, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 33398997, at *1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1996) (“Defendants respond that the terminology may be
federal, but the substance is universal. They emphasize that there is no substantive difference between California’s general demurrer and the federal motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim: both operate to test the ability of a plaintiff
to allege speciﬁc facts essential to the plaintiff’s case, in the absence of which
the complaint must be dismissed.”).
47
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(b)(4); Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay
Proceedings, In re Paciﬁc Biosciences of California Inc., No. CIV 509210, 2012
WL 1932469 (May 25, 2012) (“Third, the legislative history of PSLRA and
SLUSA demonstrates interpretation contrary to that asserted by Defendants.
Indeed, if Section 27(b)(1), pursuant to the PSLRA of 1995, already provided for
an automatic stay of discovery in related state court securities cases, there
would have been no need to enact Section 27(b)(4) under SLUSA of 1998 to give
federal courts the power to stay discovery in related state court securities
cases.”).
48

E.g., In re Cardinal Health, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 866, 876 (S.D. Ohio
2005) (“In sum, upon consideration of these factors, the Court concludes that
the circumstances herein are such that a stay of discovery in the state derivative action is appropriate.”).
49

English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

E.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131 (1988); see also Clermont, supra note 28, at 23 (explaining that Felder and
Johnson “sound[] in preemption”).
53
E.g., Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988)
(relying on Dice and Brown); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342
U.S. 259 (1952); Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); see also
Clermont, supra note 28, at 23 (explaining that Brown and Dice “sound[] in
judicial choice of law”).
54

Clermont, supra note 28, at 44–45.

55

Brown, 338 U.S. 294.

56

Dice, 342 U.S. 259.

57

Felder, 487 U.S. 131.

58

Monessen, 486 U.S. 330.

59

Johnson, 520 U.S. 911.

60

45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51 et seq.

61

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

62

Brown, 338 U.S. 294.

63

Id. at 295.

64

Id.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

43

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL
65

Id. at 297.

66

Id. at 298.

67

Dice, 342 U.S. 259.

68

Id. at 360.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 360–61.

72

Id. at 363.

73

Id.

74

Felder, 487 U.S. 131.

75

Id. at 136.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 137.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 141.

80

Monessen, 486 U.S. 330.

81

Id. at 332–333.

82

Id. at 336.

83

Johnson, 520 U.S. 911.

84

Id. at 913–14.

85

Id. at 914.

86

Id. at 922–93.

87

Bellia, supra note 36, at 962.

88

Clermont, supra note 28, at 33.

89

Id. at 36 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).

90

Id.

91

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 919 (quoting Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)).
92

E.g., Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336 (“The Pennsylvania courts cannot avoid
the application of federal law to determine the availability of prejudgment
interest under the FELA by characterizing Rule 238 as nothing more than a
procedural device to relieve court congestion.”); Felder, 487 U.S. at 143 (“Thus,
however understandable or laudable the State’s interest in controlling liability
expenses might otherwise be, it is patently incompatible with the compensatory
goals of the federal legislation, as are the means the State has chosen to effectuate it.”).
93

Brown, 338 U.S. at 108 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

94

Dice, 342 U.S. at 367 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion).
95

Felder, 487 U.S. at 2316 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

96

8A Am. Jur., Pleading & Practice Forms, Depositions and Discovery § 1.

97

See Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 61, 67–74 (2016).

44

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

[VOL. 47:1 2019] CYAN, REVERSE-ERIE, AND PSLRA DISCOVERY STAY
98

See Dice, 342 U.S. at 367 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion) (“The State judges and local lawyers who
administer the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in State courts are trained in
the ways of local practice; it multiplies the difﬁculties and confuses the
administration of justice to require, on purely theoretical grounds, a hybrid of
State and Federal practice in the State courts as to a single class of cases.”).
99

E.g., Milano v. Auhill, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 33398997, at *4 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 1996) (“No fundamental rule of California law, nor any
fundamental public policy of the state, is offended by the [discovery stay] restrictions imposed by Congress.”).
100

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918.

101

Id. at 918 n.9.

102

Felder, 487 U.S. at 2318 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 7th ed., 445 (Foundation Press 2013) (stating that Felder “appears to
have invalidated a nondiscriminatory rule, although the Court’s opinion
included an unconvincing contention that the state rule was discriminatory”).
103
See Brown, 338 U.S. at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The crucial
question for this Court is whether the Georgia courts have merely enforced a local requirement of pleading, however ﬁnicky, applicable to all such litigation in
Georgia without qualifying the basis of recovery under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act or weighting the scales against the plaintiff.”).
104

Dice, 342 U.S. at 367–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion) (“So long as all negligence suits in a State are
treated in the same way, but the same mode of disposing equitable, non-jury,
and common law, jury issues, the State does not discriminate against Employers’ Liability suits nor does it make any inroad upon substance.”).
105

Monessen, 486 U.S. at 333 (Rule 238 applied to “personal injury actions”).

106

Felder, 487 U.S. at 141.

107

Felder, 487 U.S. at 145.

108

Monessen, 486 U.S. at 335.

109

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 n.9.

110

Brown, 338 U.S. at 297.

111

Dice, 342 U.S. at 363.

112

Brown, 338 U.S. at 297.

113

Felder, 487 U.S. at 141.

114

Id.

115

Felder, 487 U.S. at 151.

116

Monessen, 486 U.S. at 335 (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly,
241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916).
117

Felder, 487 U.S. at 161 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

118

Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319
U.S. 350, 354 (1943)) (internal quotations omitted)).
119

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 920.

120

Id.

121

Milano v. Auhill, No. SB 213 476, 1996 WL 33398997, at *4 (Cal. Super.

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

45

SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL
Ct. Oct. 2, 1996) (“The intent of Congress to provide a broad and effective
method of weeding out frivolous and unsupported suits, analogous to the
purpose of the California Legislature in enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, would be frustrated if plaintiffs could evade the new restrictions
simply by ﬁling in state courts.”).
122
See Tarpley, Note, The Doctrine in the Shadows: Reverse-Erie, Its Cases,
Its Theories, and Its Future With Plausibility Pleading in Alaska, 32 Alaska L.
Rev. 213, 225 (2015) (“[B]y applying a source text-asking whether the procedure
originated internally or externally to the substantive federal claim—the case
law can be sorted into two relatively clear categories, each espousing a different
Reverse-Erie theory.”).
123

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921.

124

Id. at 921 n.12.

125

Id.

126

Brown, 338 U.S. 294.

127

Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 877, 885–86
(2011).
128

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921.

129

Brown, 338 U.S. at 294 (“Should this Court fail to protect federally created rights from dismissal because of over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in adjudication of federally created
rights could not be achieved.”).
130

Felder, 487 U.S. at 153 (“A law that predictably alters the outcome of
§ 1983 claims depending solely on whether they are brought in state or federal
court within the same State is obviously inconsistent with this federal interest
in instrastate uniformity.”); see also Johnson, 520 U.S. at 920 (discussing Felder)
(“The failure to comply with the Wisconsin statute in Felder resulted in a judgment dismissing a complaint that would not have been dismissed—at least not
without a judicial determination of the merits of the claim—if the claim had
been ﬁled in a federal court.”).
131
Monessen, 486 U.S. at 335 (“[P]rejudgment interest may constitute a signiﬁcant portion of an FELA plaintiff’s total recovery. Here, for example, the trial
court’s award of $26,712.50 in prejudgment interest under Rule 238 increased
appellee’s total recovery by more than 20 percent.”).
132

Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921.

133

Dice, 342 U.S. 259.

134

Id. at 367–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting
from the Court’s opinion).
135
Clermont, supra note 28, at 36 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
468 (1965)).
136
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in
Review, at 21 (“State 1933 Act ﬁlings have increased since the Cyan decision.”).
137

Id. at 10.

138

15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a).

139

Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066–67.

140

Priya Cherian Huskins et al., Guest Post: IPO Companies, Section 11
Suits, and California State Court, The D&O Diary (April 28, 2016), at https://w
ww.dandodiary.com/2016/04/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-ipo-compani

46

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

[VOL. 47:1 2019] CYAN, REVERSE-ERIE, AND PSLRA DISCOVERY STAY
es-section-11-suits-and-california-state-court/.
141
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in
Review, at 23.
142
Priya Cherian Huskins et al., Guest Post: IPO Companies, Section 11
Suits, and California State Court, The D&O Diary (April 28, 2016), at https://w
ww.dandodiary.com/2016/04/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-ipo-compani
es-section-11-suits-and-california-state-court/.
143
Clermont, supra note 28, at 36 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
468 (1965)).
144
Dice, 342 U.S. at 367–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring for reversal but dissenting from the Court’s opinion) (“The fact that Congress authorized actions
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to be brought in State as well as in
Federal courts seems a strange basis for the inference that Congress overrode
State procedural arrangements controlling all other negligence suits in a State,
by imposing upon State courts to which plaintiffs choose to go the rules prevailing in the Federal courts regarding juries.”); Brown, 338 U.S. at 108 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If a litigant chooses to enforce a Federal right in a State
court, he cannot be heard to object if he is treated exactly as are plaintiffs who
press like claims arising under State law with regard to the form in which the
claim must be stated—the particularity, for instance, with which a cause of action must be described . . . After all, the Federal courts are available.”).
145

Felder, 487 U.S. at 150.

146

Transcript of Oral Argument, Johnson v. Fankell, No. 96-292, 1997 WL
92111, at *16 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1997).
147

Monessen, 486 U.S. 330.

148

28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(a).

149

Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1075.

150

E.g., Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 Cal. App.
4th 800, 804 (1993) (“It is black letter law that, when a federal action has been
ﬁled covering the same subject matter as is involved in a California action, the
California court has the discretion but not the obligation to stay the state court
action.”).
151
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(b)(4); see Mustokoff, Shareholder Discovery, The
PSLRA And SLUSA In Parallel Securities And Derivative Actions, 35 Sec. Reg.
L.J. 143 (2007).

© 2019 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Spring 2019

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356779

47

